NYT Investigation Names GRU Officer Running Tokyo Network That Shipped Sanctioned Tech to Russia

A named officer, a ten-minute walk, and a paper trail

Since Russian intelligence officers began resurfacing in Tokyo after mass expulsions from European capitals, Japanese authorities have known something was happening in their own back yard. What's new is how much of it now has a name attached.

The New York Times investigation, published July 12, identifies 49-year-old Maksim Filchenkov as the officer allegedly running the operation. Publicly, he works for Aeroflot, Russia's state airline. According to Western intelligence officials cited by the Times, his actual job is coordinating procurement of restricted technology and running the logistics chains that move it out of Japan.

The office tied to the operation sits roughly a ten-minute walk from the headquarters of Japan's National Police Agency, the body responsible for investigating espionage, according to the Times and a separate account from The Japan Times cited by RBC-Ukraine. Journalists visited the office three times. On the last visit, a female employee told them Filchenkov did not wish to speak.

The shipping route

Because direct exports to Russia are illegal, the network allegedly relies on intermediary logistics firms and falsified paperwork to route goods through third countries before they reach Russia. The Times and RBC-Ukraine both name Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan and Vietnam as transit points.

One Tokyo-based firm, Proco Air, is identified in both accounts as central to the routing. The company describes itself as a bridge between Japan and Russia and told the Times it only ships goods legal under Japanese law. Its owner denied knowledge of any tie between Filchenkov and Russian intelligence, according to RBC-Ukraine.

Journalists also found documentation, cited by both outlets, showing Proco Air worked with R-Pharm, a Russian pharmaceutical company founded by Alexey Repik, who is under Western sanctions for supporting Russia's military. Proco Air's own paper trail connects it to a sanctioned Russian businessman, a detail Proco Air has not directly addressed in its comments to the Times.

Why Japan specifically

According to Ukrainian authorities, roughly 90% of Russian missiles and drones contain Japanese-made components, a figure both the Times and RBC-Ukraine cite as the reason Japan has become a priority target for the GRU's 20th Directorate, the unit both outlets identify as running the operation.

The evidence is concrete. RBC-Ukraine reports that after a Russian Kh-101 missile struck a residential building in Kyiv, Ukrainian investigators recovered Japanese electronic components from the wreckage, parts whose export to Russia is banned. In April 2025 alone, Kyiv sent at least eight diplomatic notes to Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs documenting specific parts found in missiles and drones after strikes on Ukrainian cities, according to RBC-Ukraine.

Japan has export controls on paper. Ukrainian investigators keep finding Japanese parts in missile debris anyway. Something in the enforcement chain isn't working, and neither the Times nor RBC-Ukraine reports that Tokyo has traced how those specific components got out.

The legal gap Tokyo is finally addressing

Japan doesn't run a standalone foreign intelligence service, and it has historically treated espionage as a policing matter rather than a national security one, a legacy of its postwar constitutional posture. Japanese officials told the Times they recognize the threat has outgrown that framework and are weighing legal changes to strengthen intelligence collection and counterespionage powers.

Crypto Briefing's account goes further, describing Japan's anti-espionage laws as "weak" and reporting that Tokyo has started forming a National Intelligence Council and drafting new anti-espionage legislation. That framing lines up with the Times' more cautious description of Japan "considering" legal changes, though Crypto Briefing presents Japan's legislative response as further along than the Times does. Neither the Times nor RBC-Ukraine confirms a specific bill has been introduced or a National Intelligence Council has been formally established.

Until Japan closes that legal gap, and until Tokyo can explain how Japanese-made parts keep landing in Ukrainian missile wreckage despite existing export bans, Ukraine's diplomatic notes are likely to keep coming. The open question is whether Tokyo's promised legislation turns into an actual law with teeth, or another round of officials "recognizing the threat" without changing what's enforceable.